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R859Sport is a demanding activity requiring more cognitive skills than is often 
appreciated. By trying to understand the sporting brain, in particular that of 
elite athletes, we may learn something about behaviour relevant to the normal 
population. We may also be confronted by the limits of current cognitive 
neuroscience. Here I outline some of the key areas where engaging with the 
cognitive aspects of sport will help cognitive neuroscientists to confront the 
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The goal of cognitive neuroscience 
is to understand behaviour. Much 
of the behaviour we do understand 
occurs in the laboratory, in non-
stressful conditions, using a 
computer monitor, a beep to signal 
the onset of an event, a button press 
and a formal task so that we can 
control all the variables. All good 
science. But most behaviour occurs 
in motion, in a behavioural stream 
that has ambiguous ‘start’ signals 
(sometimes internally generated), 
involves the whole body and 
language, has consequences and 
is performed under some form of 
short-term or long-term stress.  Our 
assumption as scientists is that our 
lab-based tasks will hit something 
fundamental that has relevance in 
the real world. The real world, unlike 
the lab, is of course messy, a bad 
place to do science, but if we are to 
understand behaviour, we have to 
confront it. 
A physicist is able to say that the 
desk on which my computer now 
rests is in a sense not solid (I know, 
wood is a solid), but the spacing 
of the atomic structure means 
that it is mostly empty space. This 
is true, beautiful and interesting, 
but of no use whatsoever to a 
carpenter. In cognitive neuroscience 
there is only carpentry: unlike my 
desk, people, in Skinner’s words, 
emit behaviour and behavioural 
findings only mean something in the 
real world. Laboratory behaviour 
does not have the same status as 
atomic structure, and cognitive 
neuroscience, despite inflated 
claims of applications to education, 
cognitive neuroenhancement, decision 
making and psychiatry, has in many 
senses not delivered.  We have 
not been able to build the bridges 
necessary between different levels 
of explanation, a thesis recently 
articulated by Gary Marcus [1]. We 
have to get out more, and in doing 
application of their science outside the lso it might be useful to travel to the 
other extreme of behaviour to meet 
with fast, stressful, consequential 
behaviours that really test the limits 
of the applicability of cognitive 
neuroscience. At that extreme, we will 
find sporting performance.
If asked to give examples of 
tasks that require intelligence, the 
list will usually include maths, chess, 
writing, art, creativity, medicine, 
science, music, etc. — all things 
we associate with nice, middle 
class, intellectual or school-based 
performance.  It is highly unlikely that 
sport will appear on the list. However, 
if one considers the challenges that 
elite sport performance presents 
to the brain, it is difficult to think 
of any human activity that places 
more demands on the brain (with 
the possible exception of combat 
soldier). 
The apprenticeship of an elite 
athlete can be 2–2.5 decades (longer 
than a doctor, academic or lawyer), 
placing demands on the neurological 
machinery for self control, skill 
learning, long-term planning and 
resilience to failure, judgment, defeat 
and injury. The memory demands 
in acquiring elite level skills are 
considerable (for example, a slalom 
canoeist will have a prospective 
memory for up to 75 events over 
a minute or so) and the demands 
of performing at the very highest 
level at a specific point in time are 
matched, again, perhaps only by 
the demands of a combat soldier. 
In addition, the consequences of 
sporting failure are immediate — 
feedback from team mates, coaches, 
supporters, media, sponsors and 
governing bodies is swift and often 
uncompromising. If you are not yet 
convinced, the career of an athlete, 
unlike that of any career other than 
that of a soldier, is waning at 30 and 
almost certainly over by 35 — just 
about when other professionals 
are getting into their stride (and 
scientists are still winning early 
aboratory.career prizes). This presents another 
highly unusual stress with which to 
cope.
The role of the brain in sports 
performance can also be seen in 
fatigue: muscle groups fail when 
there are still more than 50% of fibres 
available for recruitment. This has 
led to the hypothesis of a central 
governor controlling the ‘decision’ 
to fail [2]. This theory presents 
a challenge to ideas of emotion, 
responses to stress and the capacity 
of the brain to predict.
Taken together, this list of 
challenges the brain faces in 
producing a sporting performance, 
dealing with its consequences and 
the stresses of premature retirement 
present cognitive neuroscience 
with two opportunities. The first 
is to apply its findings to the 
improvement of elite sporting 
performance. The vital 1% 
enhancement in performance 
may well come from the organ 
that consumes up to 20% of the 
energy fed into the body. This 
challenge directly faces cognitive 
neuroscience with the question, 
how much of what we discover 
in the lab/scanner translates to 
consequential acts carried out under 
pressure? The second opportunity 
is to use the study of sports 
elites to inform us about normal 
behaviour, much as the study of 
neuropsychological patients has 
informed our knowledge of the 
intact brain. I think there is room 
here for meaningful advances in 
understanding and applications 
in skill learning, resilience, coping 
with defeat, decision making, 
prospective memory, reward, central 
control of the ‘decision’ to fail, 
planning, emotions, sleep and the 
notion of 10,000 hours of practice. 
Sport presents a harsh test bed 
for any claims of applicability of 
laboratory findings, but it may well 
be a proving ground for making 
psychological and cognitive 
neuroscience more directly practical 
in everyday life. 
A good start has been made. 
Noakes’ controversial model of 
the central control of fatigue [2] 
was inspired by Mosso’s earlier 
predictions [3]. The idea is 
that fatigue is an experience 
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by brain mechanisms protecting 
homeostasis, well before the limits 
of muscle are reached. Irrespective 
of one’s opinion of it, this idea 
requires us to make a link between 
the brain and a behaviour that is 
usually seen as determined entirely 
peripherally. Perhaps we do not 
need a central control mechanism 
that can predict the effort required 
to run 26 miles at the start of a 
race, but the link between the 
brain and physical performance 
is real. A series of experiments 
from Marcora and colleagues has 
shown that mental effort prior to 
exercise increases the perception 
of effort and has a detrimental 
effect on subsequent endurance 
performance [4–6]. The implications 
of this work are potentially far 
reaching for sports practitioners: 
what kinds of mental activity are 
beneficial or detrimental to physical 
performance? Understanding 
the brain mechanisms of this will 
require cognitive neuroscience to 
develop methods and models that 
can assess brain activity in real 
time under conditions of stress and 
activity.
The areas of learning and 
delivery of skill under pressure 
present other challenges to 
cognitive neuroscience, and the 
implications may go well beyond 
sport. How much should we 
teach? How much should we allow 
learning through play? Is there 
such a thing as talent, making it 
pointless to punish children with 
lessons on things they will just 
never get? Sporting skills (golf, for 
example) are sometimes closed 
systems that lend themselves to 
lab testing, but some labs have 
made great strides in capturing 
open-ended skills that are harder 
to constrain in the lab. The work 
of Keith Davids has grappled with 
the problems of long-term learning 
in many sports from football to ice 
climbing. The approach taken is 
one of understanding the ecological 
dynamics of action and learning and 
applying constraints to facilitate 
learning [7,8]. Davids’ work offers 
cognitive neuroscientists another 
chance to grasp the uncomfortable 
nettle of affordances (those pesky 
things that don’t so easily lend 
themselves to easy manipulation 
in the lab) and gives a framework, through sport, for thinking about 
complex learning of knowledge 
(which indeed is what a complex 
skill is). Affordances are the aspects 
of objects that signal possibilities 
for action: javelins for throwing; 
hurdles for jumping; balls for kicking 
etc. The active nature of sport, or  
other actions not related to sport 
(we push, press, throw, sit, catch 
etc. for other reasons) lays bare the 
shortcomings of perceptual science, 
skill learning and the science of 
decision-making.
Once learned, skills must be 
delivered under pressure and 
at a specific point in time. The 
Germans and Argentines playing 
in the World Cup final as I type 
(yes, I know, terrible planning), 
will not get a second chance. 
They have to deliver now, in front 
of millions of judging eyes. Like 
central fatigue and affordances, 
resilience is hard to pin down, but 
that is nature — the concepts at the 
core of complex behaviour may not 
prove to be as easy to manipulate 
as thresholds, attentional capacity, 
list length, button presses or any 
other of the myriad of favoured 
variables that we use as lab proxies 
of reality. The reality of behaviour 
might be messier than we would 
like. Insights into resilience in elite 
athletes has come from a number 
of studies that have measured 
the components of resilience in 
Olympic champions and elite team 
sport players [9,10]. The answers 
are not simple, but they are ripe 
for investigation in neuroimaging 
studies. What makes the best the 
best? There is an opportunity here 
to treat these elite athletes as case 
studies from which we can make 
useful generalizations, much as 
we have for over a century with 
neuropsychological single patient 
case studies. By studying the 
abnormal (the elite) we may learn 
about the population. To embrace 
this view requires a change of 
perspective in experimental 
settings. In laboratory studies we 
use populations in order to make 
population statements. But the 
Olympic champion is an outlier and 
even trying to make population 
statements about a population of 
outliers is difficult. Perhaps we can 
ask ‘what makes this person able to 
do what they do?’ It takes us away 
from the traditional population statement, but it is just another 
route to think and learn. 
A reason to embrace sport as 
a measure of our applicability is 
that sport measures output — 
ruthlessly. In an age of neuro-law, 
neuro-marketing, neuro-decision-
making, neuro-enhancement, 
neuro-whatever-one-can-get-away-
with, there will be no emerging 
field of neuro-sport for a very 
simple reason. Sport measures 
outcome with a finality of judgment 
that scientific papers would not 
pass. If we can deliver something 
from our work that passes tests 
of applicability in the sports 
domain, we will know that we 
have understood the link between 
neurons and complex behaviour. 
In return, sport is a test bed of 
nails that will demand thinking that 
may stretch traditional lab-based 
tasks in psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience to the breaking point. 
Game on? 
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